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1 Introduction
Many aspects of our lives are affected by social interactions with others. Often, the way
these relationships operate is influenced by interactions between others. For example, an
opinion communicated by one person to another is likely to have been influenced by the
outcomes of previous conversations between different pairs of individuals. That is, a given
relationship typically does not live in isolation, but rather is embedded in a social structure
consisting of many relationships. It is now well-recognized that, accordingly, if one wants
to understand many kinds of social phenomena, it is imperative to study the networks of
these social relationships, rather than restricting the level of the analysis to any particular
relationship. It thus becomes important to understand the structure of social networks,
how and why they form, and how their properties relate to the interactions, behaviors, and
processes of diffusion occurring through them.
So it is not surprising that researchers have employed a vast range of methodologies
towards these ends. One characteristic along which to broadly categorize studies of net-
work formation is in terms of those based primarily on strategic motivations as opposed
to those based primarily on random events. Naturally, real networks are formed through
a combination of randomness and self-motivated behaviors. This observation is reflected
in modeling choices and, indeed, there are numerous analyses that, to varying extents, in-
corporate both random and strategic considerations into modeling link formation processes.
Nevertheless, the literature can largely be sorted according to whether strategic considera-
tions or, instead, random events, constitute the main guiding force behind which links are
formed and which links are not formed. We here take up the latter category, and aim to
survey and discuss the literature that studies network formation by viewing random events
as the essential ingredients. See in this handbook Vannetelbosch and Mauleon (2015) for a
discussion of strategic-based models, and Vega Redondo (2015) for a survey of the literature
that explicitly takes into account the coevolution of networks and behaviors.
We posit that random network models form the foundation of modern network theory.
The literature has demonstrated that random network models are far superior to purely
strategic models in terms of generating networks with properties that are consistent with
field data on the structure of large social networks. This conclusion has several derivative
implications. First, a number of random network models offer tractable frameworks within
which to study incentives, and where it is possible to draw conclusions about how network
structure impacts behavior. Such an approach can either allow strategic considerations to be
brought into the analysis of link formation or, quite distinctly, it can allow the researcher to
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study, e.g., diffusion processes or opinion formation from a strategic perspective in a network
context. This kind of work is particularly important since, without modeling the incentives
of agents in the network, it is not possible to discuss, e.g., which network structures perform
better than others from a social perspective, nor is it possible to provide policy-oriented
conclusions.
Second, empirical work on network formation can be based only on random network
models. As data becomes increasingly available along with the computing power to analyze
it, empirical work will continue the trend of becoming increasingly important and useful. It is
worth nothing that random network models constitute the benchmark with respect to which
network properties are often described. That is, recognizing that real networks are not purely
random, once we understand the macro features of purely random networks, we can begin to
understand their discrepancies from real networks as attributable to non-random behavior.
Always, e.g., when we refer to small world networks, to skewed degree distribution or to high
clustering in a specific network, we make an implicit comparison between the particular
network we refer to and the expected outcome of some random network generation process.
By definition, the work we survey models the connections that form between agents as
probabilistic events. The simplest such models, which serve as a baseline for the rest of the
literature, view these events as independent and identically distributed across pairs of agents.
Implicit in such an approach, of course, is that agents have no observable characteristics that
are relevant to the formation of the network through affecting the probabilities with which
different agents connect to each other. A more descriptive or realistic approach would have
to accommodate the possibility of various kinds of correlations in linking outcomes. In
essence, the likelihood with which an analyst views a connection between a given pair of
agents to be formed is influenced by what is known about the characteristics of the agents,
and possibly also by the presence or absence of other links. Agents’ characteristics will
influence link outcomes if, for example, there are complementarities or substitutability of
the characteristics in the context of the relationship.
In this regard, the single most important force relating to agents’ characteristics is ho-
mophily, which is the tendency of agents with similar characteristics to link with each other.
Because homophily is so robustly observed across many contexts and dimensions, models
that incorporate (the possibility of) homophily are central to the study of random networks
in general, and often times it is the presence of homophily that allows a model to capture
real-world properties that are missing from baseline models. Homophily has been docu-
mented by sociologists along a multitude of dimensions in self–reported friendship networks,
and it is present in nearly all social networks if one examines the relevant characteristics.
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It has also been shown that homophily plays an important role in governing the outcomes
of many important network-based phenomena, through studying models of na¨ıve learning
(Golub and Jackson, 2012a), population games (Dalmazzo et al. 2014), strategic network
formation games (Jackson and Rogers 2005 and De Mart´ı and Zenou 2013), and also ran-
dom network processes (Currarini et al. 2009, 2010, Bramoulle´ et al. 2012 and structural
models for empirical estimation that we discuss in Section 4.2). With modern communica-
tion technologies, the costs of maintaining geographically separated connections has been
dramatically reduced, allowing for different patterns of social interactions. In particular,
homophily is increasing along a number of prominent dimensions (see, e.g., Rosenblat and
Mobius 2004).
Often it is difficult to disentangle from real data the role of homophily from that of peer
effects and contagion (on this see, among others, Ozgu¨r and Bisin 2013, Mele 2014 and
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2013 – and Chandrasekhar 2015 in this book). Actually,
the following econometric problem is a main open issue: what are the conditions on the data
for which this identification is possible (Angrist 2014, Shalizi and Thomas 2011)? We will
see that most current answers to this question are indeed based on specific random networks
models.
Our presentation below is delineated by a classification of models according to how they
treat population dynamics. In particular, we first distinguish network formation models that
are “one shot” from those that are dynamic and, in the latter case, according to whether the
number of nodes varies over time, and how. In particular, and also following the chronological
order of how these models came into the economics literature, Section 2 illustrates one shot
models with a fixed number of nodes, Section 3 presents growing random network models,
and Section 4 discuss dynamical models in which the number of nodes is fixed or approaches
a steady state. In Section 5 we discuss the economic literature on homophily and its deep
relation with the one on random networks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.1
2 One shot models with a fixed population
There are 2n(n−1) directed unweighted networks between n nodes, and 2
n(n−1)
2 undirected
ones. A one-shot network formation model is a probability distribution Pn among this finite
1We remark that many of our topics have received coverage in the books of Vega-Redondo (2007) and
Jackson (2008b). Relative to those contributions, we try here to convey a unified view, that includes also
the more recent developments, especially in the fields of network games and empirical estimation models.
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(but large) number of networks.2 We distinguish in this section between those models that
consider each link as an independent event, those that impose some of the network char-
acteristics, and finally those that assume a probability distribution over the characteristics,
assuming a correlation in the probability of link occurrence.
2.1 Independent link formation: a baseline
The Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960) model is at the foundation of modern network theory. It is a
simple model in which, starting from n nodes, each of the n(n−1)
2
potential undirected links
is randomly formed according to an i.i.d. probability p(n). This model presents remarkable
threshold properties : i.e. topological characteristic that arise almost surely if and only if p(n)
is above a certain threshold as n grows without bound. Informally, we say that a network
property A is monotonic if, given that it holds a.s. for a certain p(n), it also holds for any
pˆ(n) > p(n), i.e., it continues to hold when adding links to the network. So, for example, the
property of being path-connected, or having at least one cycle, are monotonic properties,
while the property of there existing isolated nodes is not.3 Then we define as Pn,p(n)(A) the
probability that the outcome of the i.i.d. generation process on n nodes, with probability
p(n), satisfy property A. The authors show that for each monotonic property A there exists
a discrete function t(n) ∈ [0, 1], which is also a probability depending on n, such that if p(n)
grows asymptotically larger than t(n) then at the limit n→∞ we have Pn,p → 1, if instead
p(n) grows asymptotically smaller than t(n) then at the limit n → ∞ we have Pn,p → 0
(while there may be an interior outcome when limn→∞
p(n)
t(n)
is a positive constant).
To provide some examples, t(n) = 1/n is the threshold above which the network has
almost surely at least one cycle and a unique giant component, while t(n) = log(n)/n is
the threshold above which the network is almost surely connected.4,5 Note that a specific
monotonic property that we consider can also have clear economic implications: so, for
example, Elliott et al. (2014), in a model on financial contagion, show that contagion on
random networks display the same threshold properties.
2The recent paper of Acemoglu et al. (2014) uses exactly this general definition.
3Path-connected means that between every pair of nodes there exists a sequence of links connecting them.
A cycle is a path that terminates at the same node where it originates.
4A component is a maximal set of connected nodes. A giant component is a component that contains a
non-trivial proportion of nodes as n grows.
5All this is treated extensively, with more examples, also in Bolloba´s (1981, 1998) and in Jackson (2008b).
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2.2 Random graphs of a given degree distribution
A generalization on the Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960) model is given when some of the charac-
teristics of the network are fixed. In this sense Pn(g) is positive only if g satisfies those
characteristics. In principle it is possible to fix many of the characteristics, such as the
clustering coefficient or the diameter.6 As an example Bianconi (2008) studies “network
ensembles with the same degree distribution, the same degree correlations and the same
community structure of any given real network” (on this see also Bianconi et al. 2008 and
the discussion on exponential random graph models in Section 2.3 below). There is also a cat-
egory of models based on an exogenous differentiation between the nodes, which determines
heterogeneous probabilities of linking (we discuss this in Section 5.1).
However, most of the literature, and particularly in theoretical economics, has focused
on networks with a predetermined degree distribution. These are called configuration models
(Bender and Canfield 1978, Molloy and Reed 1995, 1998 and Chung and Lu 2002): given a
set of nodes n, and an n–dimensional vector d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1}n for the degree distribution,
we attribute positive probability only to those networks with that degree distribution.
If the network that we want is directed, then there is a natural way to define the probabilities:
we simply assign to node i a uniformly random subset of size di from the other nodes. This
provides, with the help of combinatorics, an unambiguous way to compute Pn that will
determine i.i.d. uniform expectations for each node on her neighbors in the realized networks.
If instead we attribute positive probabilities only to undirected networks then we accept only
those outcomes where node i sends a link to node j if and only if node j reciprocates. Recent
works like Karrer and Newman (2011) show that in this case things can be complicated:
should we attribute uniform probabilities to each of the admissible network outcomes, or
should we instead try to maintain uniform expectations for each node on her neighbors in
the realized networks?7
The configuration model has found extensive application in a recent literature on Bayesian
6There are different ways to measure clustering, but the essential idea is to measure the frequency with
which two nodes who have a common neighbor are connected. The distance between a pair of nodes is
the number of links in the shortest path connecting them. A graph’s diameter is the maximum distance
between a pair of nodes. The degree of a node is the number of links it has. A degree distribution describes
the frequencies of different degrees in the population. The chapter of Chandrasekhar (2015) defines these
concepts, and others that we discuss, more formally.
7It is possible to show with a very simple example that, especially when n is low, the two considerations
are incompatible: there is only one undirected network with n = 4 and d = (1, 2, 2, 3), and in this network
node 1, who has degree 1, can only be matched with node 4, who has degree 3.
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network games, especially since Galeotti et al. (2010). In this literature it is assumed that
agents (nodes in the network) know the degree distribution, their own degree and, as a
consequence, the probability distribution of their neighbors.8 In this framework, one can
consider the case of no correlation in the degrees of linked nodes, or it could be the case
instead that, e.g. because of assortative degree correlation (see also Section 3 below on
assortativity), nodes with high degree expect to meet other high degree nodes with higher
probability than in the case of no correlation.9 Then every agent chooses, before the network
is realized, an action to be played in a given game on the realized network, computing in the
Bayesian way the expected action profile of her neighbors.10
2.3 Incorporating other network statistics
It is often the case in real world social networks, that if node i has two friends j and k, then
it is likely that also j and k are friends together. This property is known as clustering ; it was
first considered and defined in the literature on complex networks by Watts and Strogatz
(1998) (and alternative definitions are in Newman 2003) and was then empirically measured
by Ravasz and Baraba´si (2003) and Va´zquez (2003). However, the models that we discuss
below, dealing with this issue, date back to the 1970s and ’80s.
The main idea is that a network exhibits clustering if it shows a considerable amount of
closed triangles (which would be unlikely to appear in the Erdo¨s and Re´nyi 1960 model).
So, even if the classical intuition of why clustering arises is dynamical (and we will discuss
in Section 3 models reflecting such an intuition), one could imagine a one–shot network
formation model in which triangles are assigned with some specific probability. This is what
is essentially done in the class of Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM, also called p∗
8Papers that have anticipated some of the theoretical results are Jackson and Yariv (2007), Sundararajan
(2007), Lo´pez-Pintado (2006, 2008) and Galeotti and Vega-Redondo (2011). See also Bramoulle and Kranton
(2015) in this book.
9On the cases with degree correlation, see the discussion in Galeotti et al. (2010) and the general framework
proposed in Feri and Pin (2015).
10In this literature, applications to games of vaccination against the risk of contagion are in Galeotti and
Rogers (2013a,b) and in Goyal and Vigier (2015); an application to public goods is in Lo´pez-Pintado (2013);
applications to peer effects and influence are in Lo´pez-Pintado (2012) and Jackson and Lopez-Pintado (2013).
Also some market models are built on this framework: Nermuth et al. (2013) provide an application to a
price competition between firms, in a bipartite network of firms and consumers; Fainmesser and Galeotti
(2013) consider instead a game of purchasing choice in a network of consumers with positive complementary
peer effects for the consumption of a specific good. Note finally that in support of this approach, Charness
et al. (2014) provides experimental evidence of the results from Galeotti et al. (2010).
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models – see Frank and Strauss 1986, Strauss 1986, Wasserman and Pattison 1996, Anderson
et al. 1999, Park and Newman 2004, 2005 – see also Besag 1974 for a similar concept in the
field of spatial econometrics). Since Section 4 in the chapter of Chandrasekhar (2015) in this
handbook presents a detailed treatment of ERGMs, we refer the reader there for details, and
we keep our discussion here brief.
Formally, the analyst specifies a set of simple statistics that are to be satisfied by the
network g, such as the number of links L(g), the number of closed triangles T (g), and possibly
a number of more complicated structures such as loops of a certain length or clusters of k
nodes, obtaining, overall, ` structures of interest, denoted by (α1(g), α2(g), . . . , α`(g)).
Now, the probability of a network g that satisfies exactly the `-dimensional vector α of
natural numbers, one for each of the statistics, will be given by a probability
Pn(g) ∝ exp
(
β1α1(g) + β2α2(g) + · · ·+ β`α`(g)
)
=
exp
(
β1α1(g) + β2α2(g) + · · ·+ β`α`(g)
)
∑
g′∈G exp
(
β1α1(g′) + β2α2(g′) + · · ·+ β`α`(g′)
)
= exp
(
β1α1(g) + β2α2(g) + · · ·+ β`α`(g)− κ
)
. (1)
where κ is a common constant for the model.
An important issue is that calibrating an ERGM model on real data becomes computa-
tionally impossible, due to the need to estimate the value of the constant or, equivalently,
from equation (1), of the quantity∑
g′∈G
exp
(
β1α1(g
′) + β2α2(g′) + · · ·+ β`α`(g′)
)
.
All available approximation techniques (see Bhamidi et al. 2008 and Chatterjee and Diaconis
2013) rely on the assumption of independent links, which is against the spirit of the model.11
Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014) show that these techniques prove themselves to be
inaccurate when tested against simulations. The reason is, as they show, that if the param-
eters of the ERGM are all non-negative (with exclusion of the parameter attached to the
number of links), then asymptotically the ERGM is indistinguishable from an Erdo¨s and
Re´nyi (1960) graph (or a mixture of them). For this reason, Chandrasekhar and Jackson
11He and Zheng (2013) try to solve the variational problem of Chatterjee and Diaconis (2013) with an
approximation similar to mean field.
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(2014) propose Statistical Exponential Random Graph Models, in which, instead of comput-
ing exactly equation (1), one assumes sparsity of the network and approximates for each
`-dimensional vector α the log–likelihood K(α) of obtaining one of the networks satisfying
α from the random network formation process. Then, the problem reduces to estimating
Pn (g|αi(g′) = αi ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , `}) = K(α) exp (β · α)∑
α′ K(α
′) exp (β · α′) , (2)
where it is now possible to compute the sum in the denominator. Chandrasekhar and Jackson
(2014) successfully calibrate this method to real social network data for 75 Indian villages
with a population each in the order of hundreds.
2.4 A simple approach to capture basic properties
Granovetter (1973) is a pioneering paper in sociology, that after having analyzed job contact
networks through interviews, proposed the strength of weak ties idea. Essentially, since the
people we meet more often are also those that share most of our daily experience, and are
exposed to correlated sources of information, it is through the people we meet occasionally
(with whom we have the weak ties) that we obtain the most valuable information. Also,
the weak ties make it possible to decrease the overall average distance of a social network,
bridging together communities that would otherwise be disconnected, or at least very far
apart.12
With this concept in mind, Watts and Strogatz (1998) proposed a model where, starting
from a fixed lattice (a ring, or a two–dimensional grid) that establishes naturally an Euclidean
distance between the nodes, some links are rewired randomly, and this rewiring makes the
distances that they bridge in the underlying structure arbitrarily large. Historically, this
was the first step in the field of complex networks, that we will discuss in next Section 3.
We refer the interested reader to the chapter of ? for more details and perspective. It is
somewhat surprising that the Watts and Strogatz (1998) model has not been used more in
the theoretical economic literature. One potentially interesting application that could prove
useful in future research is to the idea of “searchability” of a network, also discussed at
length in ?. For example, if one needs to find a particular input for production from a node
in the network, one way to do this is to ask one’s neighbors, who can ask their neighbors,
and so forth. We have a less than complete understanding of which networks are more easily
12This is reminiscent of the work of Burt (2004), who observes how the nodes who have these long–range
weak ties are also the key nodes in the diffusion and aggregation of new ideas.
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searchable, and so perhaps more efficient under varying conditions.13 One could also consider
labor models of job search based on this framework, especially given that Kleinberg (2000,
2004, 2006) derive analytical results to study decentralized search and information diffusion
in the context of this model.
3 Network formation with a growing population
In the late 1990s, increased availability of data allowed researchers to study the empirics
of complex networks at a greater level of detail across a range of applications, including
friendship networks, professional networks such as coauthorship, and more recently using
social media and other online data such as blogs. This allowed an analysis of some key
aspects of the macroscopic structure of large social networks for the first time. As it turns
out, many networks share a number of common empirical features. A good survey on this is
Newman (2003). We will briefly discuss three of the most important empirical regularities.
The first relates to the distribution of connectivity in the network across nodes. Specif-
ically, starting from the analysis of the world wide web (see, e.g., Albert et al. 1999), and
then generalized to other complex networks (by Barabasi and Albert 1999), it was shown
that the degree distribution exhibits heavy tails . That is, there are many nodes with rela-
tively few connections and, perhaps more importantly, there are also many nodes that are
highly connected. The observation of heavy-tailed degree distributions has sometimes been
strengthened to claim that networks exhibit a power-law degree distribution, at least in the
upper tail. Intuitively, if one is interested in understanding processes that operate across
a network, the degree distribution is of central importance. For example, if a disease is
spreading through a population, the outcome will be heavily influenced by the prevalence
of high degree nodes, since they are both more likely to be infected and then more likely to
spread the disease to many other nodes.
The second regularity is high clustering, as discussed in Section 2.3. That is, two given
nodes who have a common neighbor are more likely to be connected. Networks with high
clustering thus have strong correlations in link patterns, and tend to have highly intercon-
nected subsets of individuals. The level of clustering is also very important for how certain
processes operate on a network. If one is interested in how information (e.g., about job
openings) spreads, a highly clustered network will generate a lot of repeated information.
13We discuss in Section 5.1 another way to tell the weak ties story that has been adopted in some theoretical
economic papers, where the underlying distance is given by a segregation of the nodes in communities, given
by homophily.
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The third regularity is positive assortativity, which is to say that highly connected nodes
are more likely to have highly connected neighbors than poorly connected nodes (see, e.g,
Newman 2002).
The fairly robust presence of these properties begs for a common explanation of why they
should arise across a wide range of settings. A rough intuition is the following. As a network
evolves, there is naturally some level of heterogeneity across nodes, arising perhaps partly
through chance, and this results in differential numbers of connections across nodes. Then,
as new connections are formed, it is easier or more likely to come into contact with the nodes
that already have more connections. This could be because of their initial popularity (even
if it is by chance), or more mechanically if there is some process of searching for nodes along
existing links, then nodes with more links are more likely to be found. The key implication
is that any initial differences in connectivity will tend to be exacerbated through the process
oof forming additional links. Thus, eventually, one expects there to be a significant number
of very highly connected nodes, since more connections lead to a fast rate of acquiring even
more connections. At the same time, one expects there to be many poorly connected nodes,
as having few connections means that new connections are harder to come by.
If there is a search process that is responsible for the formation of new connections, then
that process will also tend to create clustering. One can imagine meeting the friends of
current friends and connecting to them, as in Jackson and Rogers (2007), or copying the
connections of one’s neighbors, as in Va´zquez (2003). Either of those processes directly
induces patterns in which one’s friends tend to be friends of each other, precisely because
the common friend generated the meeting in the first place.
Such a search process operates over time, and nodes accumulate new connections gradu-
ally. Thus, a node’s degree is typically correlated with its age: it is older nodes who have had
more time to accumulate many connections. So if one focuses on the most highly connected
nodes, they tend to be older nodes and, as such, tend to be connected to other old nodes,
as those are the ones who were available to receive connections earlier on in the evolution of
the network.
What this intuition suggests is that models that explicitly account for network growth,
especially those based on an explicit search process, have the potential to offer a parsimonious
explanation for some of the most robust empirical regularities of real networks. Our focus
in this section is on understanding the essential properties of such models.
3.1 Uniform link formation: a baseline
Jackson (2008b) presents a simple model of a growing network that we summarize briefly
11
here, as it provides a useful benchmark and introduces some of the techniques used in
analyzing such models.
Time is discrete and at time 0 there are m nodes arranged in a fully connected network. At
time t a new node enters (let us call this node also t, without ambiguity) and casts with
uniform probabilities m links to some of the t−1+m nodes that are currently present in the
system.14 In this model, if we aggregate out– and in–degrees, the expected degree of node i
at time t is
m+
m
i+ 1
+
m
i+ 2
+ · · ·+ m
t
' m
(
1 +
∫ t
i
1/τ dτ
)
= m
(
1 + log
(
t
i
))
. (3)
Nodes that have expected degree less than d at time t are those such that
m(1 + log(t/i)) < d ⇒ i > t e− d−mm . (4)
From here, it is straightforward to see that the process thus generates an exponential degree
distribution. In a sense, this model can be seen as the analogue of the Erdos-Renyi model
for the setting of a growing network, in that all nodes form their sets of links independently
and with uniform attachment probabilities. Notice, in particular, that the probability of
acquiring new links from entering nodes is independent of a node’s current degree. As this
model is therefore lacking a “rich get richer” aspect of link accumulation, it is not surprising
that it generates a thin-tailed degree distribution. Moreover, the model does not generate
high clustering. Notice that as the network grows, it becomes increasingly sparse. In asking
whether two given nodes are connected, conditioning on the event that they have a common
friend does not change the answer, and so clustering coefficients tend to zero as the population
grows. Notice, however, that assortativity does occur. The highest degree nodes tend to be
the oldest nodes, who tend to be connected to each other. One takeaway is that assortativity
is perhaps one of the most basic consequences of a wide range of growing network models.
Before going on, let us examine the implicit assumptions that we have used to obtain
the expression (4) which delivers the exponential degree distribution. We have adopted a
continuous time approximation to derive a closed form expression in equation (3). Also, we
have taken expected outcomes to compute the degree distribution in (4), not considering any
other higher order moment of the distribution around this first order approximation. This
simplifying approach is what is called mean field approximation, and we will use it also below
14It is essentially this rule of attachment, that here is uniform, that characterizes the different growing
network models. For a general framework for growing networks see the model proposed by Lobel and Sadler
(2015b,a).
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to consider the more complicated models. The technique is extremely helpful because the
underlying link formation model, while simple at the individual level, generates a highly path-
dependent stochastic process that is difficult to analyze directly. Some research has derived
analytical results without having to invoke a mean field approximation, but more often the
literature has proceeded by testing, through simulations, that the outcomes predicted by the
mean field approach provide a reasonably good description of the real process.
3.2 Preferential attachment
We now turn our attention to models that do a better job of capturing the empirical regu-
larities discussed above. In particular, the main point of this subsection is that by adjusting
the link probabilities away from uniform attachment in a fairly natural way, one can readily
generate a heavy-tailed degree distribution. This idea originated in Price (1965, 1976), who
built on Simon (1955), but he did not see the generality of his model. The mathematics
underlying the approach first appeared in Yule (1925). However, the idea re-entered the
literature more recently in Barabasi and Albert (1999), at which point the power of the idea
became more widely recognized.
The essential idea is to specify the linking process such that a node’s probability of
attracting a new link at any given moment of time is proportional to its current degree at
that time. Let us denote node i’s degree at time t by ki(t). Adjusting the model above
to account for preferential link attachment, and applying the mean field approximation, we
have
dki(t)
dt
= m
(
ki(t)
2mt
)
=
ki(t)
2t
,
since each of the m links formed at time t reaches agent i with probability equal to agent i’s
degree divided by the sum of all degrees in the network. Starting from the initial condition
ki(i) = m, we reach the solution
ki(t) = m
√
t/i.
Thus, the nodes i that have degree ki(t) ≤ d at time t, for some given d are such that
m
√
t/i < d⇒ i >
(m
d
)2
.
This produces a degree distribution given by F (d) = 1− (m
d
)2
, which is a power-law distri-
bution and, most notably, has a heavy-tailed (scale free) degree distribution.
Notice that the preferential attachment model retains the assortativity from the first
growing model, and generates a power-law degree distribution through a constant rate of
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entry of new nodes that form links with probabilities in proportion to existing nodes’ current
degrees.
However, at least when the model is interpreted such that link formation is independent
across nodes, preferential attachment on its own does not predict high clustering. A second
observation is that, while the power-law distribution exhibits heavy tails, it is a very precise
prediction, and frequently does not match well observed distributions, except possibly in the
upper tail.15 We now describe a model that is motivated by these two obervations.
3.3 Network search: combining uniform and preferential meetings
We will present a simplified version of the network growth model of Jackson and Rogers
(2007). The model is based on the idea that some connections are formed largely due to
random or idiosyncratic forces, while other connections are found through existing links.
That is, one of the main ways that nodes find each other is by meeting them through their
existing neighbors.
More specifically, we shall assume that each entering node first forms a given number,
mR, of connections to other nodes found uniformly at random, exactly as in the model of
Section 3.1. Then, from these partners, the node meets a given number mN of additional
nodes who are connected to his original partners. The idea is that these network-based
meetings capture a process of meeting “friends of friends”.
There is a related idea of vertex copying in the physics literature first studied by Va´zquez
(2003). In this approach an entering node first finds an existing node at random, and then
makes additional links to all of that node’s partners. While it was not fully appreciated at
the time, vertex copying produces many of the same insights as the friends of friends model.
To study the friends of friends model, we will now account for the orientation of links,
distinguishing inlinks from outlinks. Each node forms m = mR +mN outlinks at birth (and
never forms additional outlinks). Inlinks, on the other hand, are accumulated from entering
nodes over time. Applying the mean-field analysis as before, the growth of node i’s indegree,
now denoted ki(t), is governed by
dki(t)
dt
=
mR
t
+mN
(
ki(t)
tm
)
, (5)
where the first term accounts for the possibility to be found at random, and the second term
accounts for the possibility that one of i’s in-neighbors is found at random, and then i is
15Note also that it is practically impossible for all but the largest data sets if a sample of real data actually
exhibit a power law distribution (on this see e.g. Virkar et al. 2014).
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found though the network. Using the initial condition that ki(i) = 0, one reaches an indegree
distribution described by
F (d) = 1−
(
rm
d+ rm
)1+r
,
where r = mR/mN is the ratio of the number of links formed at random versus through the
network.
This degree distribution is interesting, since it predicts a power-law in the upper tail, but
a somewhat thinner lower-tail, with a shape depending on the value of the parameters. To
see this, note that for large degree d, i.e. the upper tail, the distribution is approximately
F¯ (d) = 1 − (rm/d)1+r. On the other hand, for lower degrees, the distribution is not well
approximated by a power-law.
As it turns out, more careful empirical analysis often shows that power-law-like degree
distributions are mostly found only for the highest degree nodes, and so this class of degree
distributions is fairly well-suited to capturing this feature. Notice finally that the friends of
friends meetings (or similarly the vertex copying model) directly generates high clustering:
whenever two nodes meet through the network, it is precisely because they have a friend in
common.
4 Dynamic network formation
Here we consider a class of dynamic models where the number of nodes is not necessarily
growing, and may even be constant. Most of the modeling with this approach comes from
the economic literature, because of necessities that we will go through case by case. Such
models have been analyzed only very recently also in the other disciplines.16
16The first work from economists considered situations in which not only the network was endogenous,
but also some action played by nodes in the network: first papers are Jackson and Watts (2002) and Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2005). This approach was then broadened in more complex settings in papers outside of
economics, in, e.g., Marsili et al. (2004) , Ehrhardt et al. (2006b,a) , Holme and Newman (2006) , Gross and
Blasius (2008) , and Ko¨nig and Tessone (2011). These results are recently coming back into the economic
literature with Fosco et al. (2010) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014). With a more applied view, Lee and Fong (2013)
have a market model with a fixed number of farsighted agents, while Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013)
use a two–period model with endogenous network and actions for empirical estimation. Models in which
agents make choices in an evolving network are treated extensively by Vega Redondo (2015) in this book.
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4.1 Search and matching
One way to model network formation and, if desired, at the same time behavior mediated by
that network, is to base meetings on a search model. This idea has its roots in the seminal
work of Diamond (1982a,b), where the focus was on labor markets rather than networks,
per se, but the general methodology is well suited to a more network-centric analysis.
This approach can incorporate both random and strategic network formation elements.
This is probably why it appears only in the economic literature. We focus here primarily on
the random components; see Vannetelbosch and Mauleon (2015) for a specific treatment of
strategic factors.
Currarini et al. (2009) apply such an approach to studying link formation in the presence
of types, focusing on the role that type-based preferences play in equilibrium. Let us sum-
marize how the model works. Agents enter the system over time and search for partners,
whom they meet randomly. A given agent stays active in the system until the marginal
benefit of additional search falls below its marginal cost. This random meeting process may
exhibit biases, that we discuss in Section 5.
Immorlica et al. (2013) adopt a new approach also based on a matching and search
framework. In their model, agents are born into the system over time and initiate a given
number of connections to others found uniformly at random. At each date, agents choose to
cooperate or defect and play a prisoners’ dilemma with their current partners. Then, agents
can sever any set of connections that they wish. Some agents are randomly chosen to die,
and then at the next date, any agent with unused connections re-initiates new meetings in
the subsequent period. Immorlica et al. (2013) study the extent to which cooperation can be
supported in equilibrium. Under favorable parameters, full cooperation can be supported.
Otherwise, if there is any cooperation, it takes the form of a specific fraction of the pop-
ulation cooperating, while others defect, so that the two behaviors co-exist. Even though,
in their model, agents are anonymous, and are not threatened by a contagion of defecting
behavior, cooperation can be supported because of a network effect: in equilibrium, cooper-
ating agents are able to accumulate many profitable relationships, whereas defectors live in
relative isolation, losing all of their links after every period.
Pin and Rogers (2014) apply a similar approach to studying immigration policy. In their
model, agents enter either as immigrants or as the offspring of citizens. The main question is
to understand how a policy of punishing defecting immigrants impacts equilibrium outcomes,
when individuals are motivated by the outcomes of playing prisoners’ dilemmas in a society
where connections are made and lost according to the model of Immorlica et al. (2013).
The main finding is that, while increasing punishment increases the level of cooperation in
16
society, it also has the consequence of increasing the rate of defection among citizens. The
intuition is that there is a natural level of cooperation in society dictated by the models
parameters. When the cost of defecting is increased for immigrants through punishment,
there will be a partial substitution into defecting behavior by citizens.
4.2 Structural models
One of the most useful notions of equilibrium for strategic network formation games is
pairwise stability (see Vannetelbosch and Mauleon (2015) in this book): in a nutshell, a
network is pairwise stable if, (i) when two nodes are linked together, neither of them prefer
to delete the link; and (ii) if they are not linked together, it is not the case that both of
them prefer to create the link. One interpretation of this notion is through a matching pool
mechanism: in the society, people are randomly and sequentially matched in couples, and
every couple can re–consider their link, and create it with mutual agreement, if absent, or
delete it if present, if at least one of them wishes to do so. This implies a Markov process
between all possible network configurations, where pairwise stable equilibria are absorbing
states (as discussed in Jackson and Watts 2002).
One can introduce some noise into this system, in the form of possible errors made by
the agents, or in the form of shocks on their utility functions, so that the Markov process
becomes ergodic, i.e. with no more absorbing states. In this case it is possible to compute
ergodic probabilities of each network, as if they were the probabilities of a one–shot network
formation model, as those discussed in Section 2 above. If errors are small, pairwise stable
networks would still be likely outcomes, but every possible network will have some positive
probability to be in place.
There are at least three recent papers that adopt this approach as a structural model
for empirical estimation: they are Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013), Mele (2014) and
Graham (2014). They will be covered also by Chandrasekhar (2015) in this book, and as
they are related to homophily we will come back to their results in Section 5. Here we just
present the main idea, abstracting from the specific models.
Suppose that there is an undirected17 network gt between n nodes at every moment t
in discrete time, and that at time t a matching technology provides positive probability to
any pair (i, j) of nodes (but just one pair per period) to consider their mutual link. Node
i gets a utility Ui(gt ∪ {ij}) from the network with that link in place (which could be gt
itself, if originally ij ∈ gt), and a utility Ui(gt\{ij}) from the network without that link in
17Mele (2014) actually considers a directed network.
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place (which could also be gt, in the complementary case). We call ∆t,jUi = Ui(gt ∪ {ij})−
Ui(gt\{ij}), and the same holds for node j. Then, gt+1 = gt ∪ {ij} if and only if both
∆t,jUi + ηi > 0 and ∆t,iUj + ηj > 0 ,
where ηi and ηj are i.i.d. random shocks. Otherwise, gt+1 = gt\{ij}.
This Markov process is ergodic, and when the shocks follow a Weibull distribution (as in
the assumptions of the standard logit model) the problem of estimating ergodic probabilities
is very similar to the one discussed in Section 2.3 for ERGM models. In this case, only
for some limiting cases, or when a potential function exists for the utilities, is it possible to
numerically compute these probabilities.
5 Homophily
When observing a social network from the real world, and even considering our own per-
ceptions of social networks surrounding us, we always find evidence that similar people are
more likely to be connected together than if they were different along some dimension: this
applies to cultural classification, age, gender, and so on.
Formally, suppose that the population of a society is heterogeneous, which we model by
proposing a partition into a finite number of types, which could denote a classification like
age–groups, or self reported racial groups. Each type θ has a frequency in the population of
wθ ∈ [0, 1], so that
∑
θ′ wθ′ = 1. Now we check the friends of some agent i, where i belongs
to type θ. In this set of friends those that are also of type θ are a proportion Hi of the
neighborhood of i that we call the homophily of agent i. In the same way we can define the
homophily of a whole group θ considering the aggregate measure
Hθ ≡ average # of friends of θ’s members, which are also in θ
average # of friends of θ’s members
.
The problem is that Hθ is not a relative measure, therefor we normalize it with respect to
wθ through imbreeding homophiliy :
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hθ ≡ Hθ − wθ
1− wθ ,
that is positive only when there is positive bias in favor of own type, and reaches its maximum
at 1 when all members of θ have only friends from θ.
18This is also known as the Coleman (1958) index.
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So, we say that a type θ is homophilous if it has Hθ > wθ, or equivalently hθ > 0,
and we can also compare more or less homophilous types. This however does not help us
in understanding the causes of this observed segregation: is it due to the choices of the
individuals in θ, to the choices of the rest of the population, or to biases in the meeting
opportunities, e.g. because a type is correlated with the occupation of individuals? Also the
biases in meetings could result as an effect: as Montgomery (1991, 1992) has shown, if job
places are allocated through informal contacts, as in the Granovetter (1973) weak ties story,
then homophilous behavior results in occupational segregation. Note that we consider the
types as exogenous, and we refer to homophily as the tendency of similar people to connect
together. However types could be endogenous, and diffusion processes (see Lamberson 2015
in this book) could cause people that are connected together to become similar. When both
homophily and diffusion are present, the identification of causalities for observed segregation
becomes an extremely hard task, as discussed in Chandrasekhar (2015) in this book.
The classical economic theory was based on the assumption of a representative agent,
abstracting from heterogeneity. However, a preliminary attempt to explain the observed ho-
mophily in residential segregation with an elegant and general model is in Schelling (1971).19
Separately, from the pioneering work of Becker (1973), matching theory has focused attention
on assortative matching, thereby emphasizing one of the sources of observed homophily.20
Below we discuss the recent contributions based on homophily and the implications of ho-
mophily in various economic models. Then we end with a discussion of the relationships
between the models, which are also based on some randomness in the network formation
process, and the empirical estimation of real network datasets.21
5.1 Static link formation
The first implication of homophily is that, as soon as there is some heterogeneity in the
characteristics of the nodes, not every pair of nodes will have the same probability to be
19Schelling (1971) is based on a grid structure with cells that resemble some of the topological properties
of networks, referring to neighbors as those cells that are adjacent in the grid. Agents have a preference for
having neighbors of their same type, and can jump to another random location (in a network setting, they
would reshuffle all their links) if unsatisfied. The main result is that even mild preferences for own type can
result in dramatic segregation.
20Note that assortative matching, which refers to an outcome in which types (skill, beauty, productivity,
etc.) of paired agents are positively correlated, is quite distinct from the network-based notion of assortativity,
which refers instead to a correlation between the degrees of linked nodes.
21Jackson and Rogers (2005), De Mart´ı and Zenou (2013) and Boucher (2015) consider network formation
games that are deterministic. We do not cover them in this chapter.
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linked together. The most intuitive way to apply this is generalizing the Erdo¨s and Re´nyi
(1960) model in a way that assigns to each pair (i, j) a linking probability p(i, j) that depends
on the characteristics of the nodes. In a simplified setting, the characteristic of a node is
just a type, as in the definition of homophily above, the linking probability depends on the
types of the two nodes, and it is typically higher when the two types coincide. An intuition
that comes out is that a few rare links will connect parts of the population that are different
and otherwise largely disconnected, and this also reminds one of the concepts of weak ties
and structural holes that we have introduced in Section 2.4 (there the underlying distance
between nodes was given by an exogenous Eudlidean topology, while here it is given by
the exogenous characterization). Jackson (2008b,a) surveys properties of such models, and
in Section 5.3 we discuss Golub and Jackson (2012a) who use a benchmark case for their
analysis.
In general, one could think that the characteristics of an individual is not just a single
label, but that it is better described by a vector of (potentially continuous) variables: age,
education, skills, political opinion, rate of self–identification with a particular culture. . . This
representation may not be completely exogenous (as discussed above), but one can still treat
it as such in the context of a model. In this way every node i is characterized a vector
αi ∈ Rm, where m is the number of characteristics that we consider, and we can think of
i as a point in an m–dimensional space, that can be endowed with many possible metrics.
In this setting, Gauer and Landwehr (2014) and Iijima and Kamada (2014) are two recent
theoretical papers which assume that the probability of linking p(i, j), of two nodes i and
j, depends in a monotonic decreasing way on their distance in this m–dimensional space.
The two approaches differ in the distance metric they consider: Gauer and Landwehr (2014)
consider the Euclidean distance when m = 1, while Iijima and Kamada (2014) adopts the
k’th norms, in which the distance between two points in the type space is the k’th smallest
distance among the m dimension-wise distances between them. The latter choice allows
the expected realized network to obtain a higher level of clustering and maintain a small
diameter.
5.2 Linking based on friendship
We will discuss two friendship models that allow for an interesting analysis of homophily. The
first is based on a matching model and the second is based on a growing network formation
model.
Let us, thus, return first to the analysis of Currarini et al. (2009, 2010), which we antic-
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ipated in Section 4.1 as a model of search and matching. In their model each individual is
endowed with a type that comes from a discrete set θ ∈ Θ (we continue to denote the pro-
portion of type-θ agents in the population by wθ), and the combination of random meeting
and preference-based biases over types have some interesting consequences. If a type has a
high representation in the matching pool, and if members of that type place high value on
meeting others of the same type, then the expected benefit of search will remain high for this
type, and so they will have a greater number of total connections. Building on this intuition,
and assuming types prefer meeting others of the same type, if a given type constitutes a large
share of the population, then they will optimally search more, and so their representation in
the matching pool will be even higher than wθ, leading to an even more attractive calculation
for their continued search. Thus, the two sources of biases are inherently intertwined and,
in this way, can reinforce each other.
Their model allows one to understand a number of empirical regularities of segregation
patterns in friendship networks as a consequence of homophily-related biases. The first
empirical regularity is that individuals in larger groups tend to form more total connections.
Formally, the equilibrium number of connections should be increasing in wθ. It is important
to note that this prediction is not universally born out in the literature. In the present
model, a necessary condition for agents of different types to prefer different numbers of total
connections is that they have type-based preferences. Thus, in a given application, if all
biases are opportunity-based, rather than preference-based, one would not expect such a
pattern in the data.
The second empirical regularity relates to inbreeding homophily hθ, which captures the
excess proportion of same-type friends over the type’s representation in the population,
normalized to have a maximum value of unity. The empirical regularity is that hθ is inverse-
U shaped, showing the greatest levels of homophily for groups of intermediate sizes, but
generally positive even for the smallest and largest groups. In the model, this prediction
relies on a combination of preference-based on opportunity-based same-type biases. The
opportunity-based bias is important because it allows all groups, including the small groups,
to meet same-types at relatively high rates.22
We now turn attention to the analysis of Bramoulle´ et al. (2012), who extend the model
from Jackson and Rogers (2007) that we discussed in Section 3.3 to incorporate types and
22While Currarini et al. (2009) assume exogenous meeting biases, a micro–foundation for this is provided
by Currarini and Vega-Redondo (2013). Currarini and Vega-Redondo (2013) assume that agents have a
trade–off in making new connections between homophily and diversity. This results in different searching
strategies which in turn endogenously biases their matching pools.
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homophily-based biases. Agents are again assigned a type from a finite set. Random meetings
are biased in the following way. Let p(θ, θ′) denote the probability that an entering agent
of type θ meets an agent of type θ′ in the random meeting process. In general, p(θ, θ′)
can differ arbitrarily from the type frequencies, allowing for biases. Then, conditional on the
realization of p, an agent from the appropriate type is drawn uniformly at random.23 Letting
p(θ) be the probability of being born of type θ (the wθ discussed above), we let P
t
j (θt, θj)
denote the probability that a node born in period j of type θj receives a link from a node
of type θt born at time t > j, the following expression is a mean–field approximation of the
overall linking probability, that generalizes equation (5):
P t+1j (θ, θj) = mR
p(θ)p(θ, θj)
tp(θj)
+mN
∑
θ′∈Θ
p(θ)p(θ, θ′)
∑t
λ=j P
λ
j (θ
′, θj)
tp(θ′)
1
m
, (6)
where m, mR and mn are those described in Section 3.3. This multi–dimensional set of
|Θ| × |Θ| differential equations can be expressed in a more compact way as
Pt+1j =
mR
t
B +
mS
mt
B
t∑
λ=j
Pλj , (7)
where
B(θ, θ′) ≡ p(θ)p(θ, θ
′)
p(θ′)
. (8)
Following the mean field approach, we can transform equation (7) into a continuous differ-
ential equation in matrix form, which has a unique solution.
This model generates a number of testable predictions. One finding of interest is that,
for quite different reasons, inbreeding homophily exhibits the same inverse-U shape as a
function of group size as in the Currarini et al. (2009) analysis. A main object of interest
in the Bramoulle´ et al. (2012) analysis concerns integration, i.e., the tendency of an agent’s
set of friends to become less and less biased over time. In their linking process, the friends
of friends meetings creates a channel through which an agent meets a less biased set of
nodes compared to direct search of her immediate neighborhood. Since as an agent ages,
she tends to be found more and more through the friends of friends channel, compared to
through random search, her neighborhood begins to reflect a diminished bias over time.
In particular, when search-based meetings are unbiased, the authors show that in the long
run, every agent’s local neighborhood converges to the type frequencies in the population.
23The search-based meetings are allowed to be similarly biased, although much of the analysis assumes
neutrality for these meetings.
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Nonetheless, the network at large can still be heavily biased, as the neighborhoods of younger
agents will generally be same-type biased.
This finding is actually quite reminiscent of the work of Chaney (2014) in the context of
international trade. Indeed, the main mechanism at work is similar in the two cases. In the
setup of Chaney (2014), the friends of friends channel translates into the finding that the
trading partners of one’s trading partners are located further away in space, and he finds an
analogue to long run integration. We refer to the reader to Chaney (2015) in this book for
more discussion.
One takeaway from these papers is that a combination of type-based biases, along with
their equilibrium consequences, is quite capable of capturing a broad range of empirically
relevant homophilous patterns. While the two models are quite different from each other,
both of them impose a combination of biases that have interesting interactions that generate
the main results. Whether a search model or a network growth model is more appropriate
for a given application, or whether one wants to explicitly model preferences, depends on
the details and goals of a given study.
5.3 Implications of homophily
While the previous subsections have discussed some of the ways in which homophily can arise,
we now turn our attention to understanding some of the various consequences of homophilous
connection patterns. That is: what is the importance of homophily in social networks?
In many important applications, the interactions between agents, the structure of which
is captured through the network, are influenced by the types of the agents. Agents with
similar views or backgrounds may communicate at lower cost, for example. Or it could be
that agents with similar opinions are more likely to talk to each other, and this will clearly
have an influence on how opinions evolve over time. The spread of epidemics will be strongly
influenced by how segregated different groups in the population are from each other.
Taking up the first idea, it is possible to study opinion evolution under simple rules
of updating.24 What will the presence of homophily imply about eventual opinions in a
population? Golub and Jackson (2012a,b) study these questions and derive some interesting
results. Consider a process in which agents update their opinions by taking weighted averages
of the opinions of their neighbors. Such a model was first proposed by French Jr (1956) and
DeGroot (1974), and is a natural way to capture a na¨ıve learning dynamic or a myopic
24See Golub and Sadler (2015) in this book for a deeper discussion and for the distinction between Bayesian
and na¨ıve learning models.
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best reply under a simple utility specification. The key insight here is that homophily
is tied to segregation, in that highly homophilous societies tend to have groups that live in
relative isolation from each other, due to the relative sparsity of connections between groups.
That segregation, in turn, has important implications for opinion dynamics. Under general
conditions (essentially that the network is path-connected and aperiodic), opinions converge
to a consensus in the long-run. But an important object of interest is the speed of that
convergence. Golub and Jackson (2012a,b) demonstrate that more homophilous societies
converge much more slowly.
Coming now to the idea of contagion in networks, Golub and Jackson (2012a,b) show also
that on an exogenous network homophily does not play a role in the contagion process, as
long as the diameter of a network is kept fixed. However in an economic process of contagion
in which agents react endogenously to the risk of being infected, Galeotti and Rogers (2013b)
present a simple model that shows how the level of homophily impacts the contagion of an
infectious disease. In their work, there are two populations who interact with each other, with
a parameter β that controls the probability that any given interaction is same-type. Thus,
for β > 1/2, the connections are homophilous, while for β < 1/2, most connections are across
groups as in, for example, the case of sexual contacts and gender. Agents strategically choose
whether or not to immunize at a cost. Agents who remain vulnerable anticipate outcomes
according to the steady-state of a standard SIS diffusion process, see, e.g. Bailey et al.
(1975). Under these dynamics, agents become infected through their connections to other
infected agents, and they recover at a given exogenous rate.
In equilibrium, agents balance the cost of immunization against the cost of time spent
infected. To illustrate the importance of homophily, consider starting from a world in which
the two groups are completely separate, i.e., β = 1 and there are no cross-group connections.
Suppose that the cost of immunization is slightly lower (relative to the benefits of being
healthy) in, say, group A, so that group A immunizes at a slightly higher rate. Now consider
the effects of gradually mixing the two groups, so that the world is homophilous, but not
perfectly so. The essence of the result is that equilibrium outcomes in the two groups diverge,
so that the consequence of mild homophily is to magnify the slight underlying difference
between the groups. As individuals from group A come into contact with those in group
B, they are exposed to slightly more infection, since group B has lower immunization. This
causes group A to adjust upwards their already higher immunization rate. Conversely, group
B benefits from the lower exposure due to interacting with group A, so that they have less
incentive to immunize. As the two groups interact more and more, eventually group B stops
immunizing all together.
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One remark is that this is a very simple model, relying on a basic diffusion process and
a simple homophily structure. A promising avenue of further research is to explore various
directions for modeling strategic decisions that depend on type-dependent contact patterns.
Another domain where network structure and, in particular, homophily, will have im-
portant effects is in market settings including, for example, product adoption. In a world
in which consumers communicate with each other about product experiences, there are a
range of pricing and competition questions to be addressed, so as to understand differences
in such environments compared to cases in which consumers have complete information ex
ante. Two papers that study demand and pricing effects are Campbell (2013) and Chuhay
(2014). We think this is an area that will gain increasing attention.
5.4 Empirical estimation of homophilous biases
As pointed out in the beginning of this section, even when we are sure that the classification
into types is exogeneous, it is very difficult to empirically disentangle the sources of observed
segregation. Schelling (1971) already demonstrated that this can depend on the choices
of one or another group, or possibly many groups, and on the meeting constraints that
people from different groups have, because, e.g., some variable (e.g. workplace or hobbies) is
correlated with type, and this bias in opportunities can itself recursively be caused by all of
the former factors. From the point of view of the econometrician, homophilous biases can be
included in one–shot homophilous models (Section 5.1), matching pool models (Section 4.1),
structural models (Section 4.2), or in some of the mean field results from growing network
models (Section 3). In all cases the problem is to estimate the level of this bias for each
group.
It is possible to analyze data where simultaneously more similar environments are ob-
served, e.g. many high schools where different ethnic groups or races are differently repre-
sented, as in the Add Health dataset.25 In this case the units of observation for the analysis
are the average behavior of members of one type in each school, and it is clear that many
environments are needed to obtain statistical significance. Under these conditions, matching
pool models are particularly suited, as they allow the analyst to specify also a bias in the
meeting opportunities, as has been done by Currarini et al. (2010), who find a great het-
erogeneity both in opportunities and in choices between the different ethnic groups.26 Both
25 The National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (commonly referred to as Add Health) is a
program project that started in 1994 collecting data from a representative sample of almost 100 U.S. High
Schools, it was designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris.
26Another possibility is to specify an underlying random network of opportunities on which agents estab-
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sources of bias are significant in the data, and they also differ significantly across races. For
example, Asians and Blacks have a much stronger chance-based bias than Whites. Estimated
preference biases range from valuing inter-race connections at 90% of the level of intra-race
connections for Asians, to 55% for Blacks.
When instead the researcher has a single snapshot of the network, or data from only
a limited number of points in time (as panel data on the same network, or only a few
separated environments), then the neighborhood of each single node must be used as a unit
of observation. The most natural theoretical framework to test seems to be one–shot network
formation models, and the benchmark models, where the probability of linking p(i, j) depends
only on the types of i and j, have been applied to empirical estimation by Newman (2004)
and Copic et al. (2009) (in this case they are sometimes called block models). However, these
applications have proved themselves not to be robust, and require Monte Carlo methods
to estimate the confidence levels. Another approach is to use structural models, as in Mele
(2014), Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Graham (2014). This approach provides
more stable outcomes, but has the drawback of being computationally difficult, so that a
modern computer is able to process only a network whose size is on the order of some
hundreds of nodes.27
6 Conclusion
Thus far, the most successful models of network formation are based primarily on random
events. Analyses without an explicit random component produce severely stylized network
structures. As a result, our current theoretical toolkit for studying social networks in eco-
nomics has benefited greatly from graph theory and combinatorial techniques in mathemat-
ics. This approach has allowed us to learn a great deal about the connections between the
micro-level stochastic processes of link formation and the large-scale structural characteris-
tics they produce in a network. Leveraging observational and empirical work on the structure
of social networks to identify and calibrate models that best fit macroscopic network features,
we can then make inferences about the linking processes by which those networks form.
The tradeoff inherent in this approach is that one need not model explicitly behavior as
arising from incentives or objectives of the agents involved. This omission largely precludes
lishes links with some preferential bias, as in Franz et al. (2010).
27Here we have highlighted only the models underlying the empirical approach on detecting homophily in
social networks. More details, and in particular the description of the methods, are in Chandrasekhar (2015)
in this book.
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addressing welfare and policy questions. For this reason, much of the random network
formation literature has come from disciplines outside economics. We think an area of
particular interest to economists, and to those seeking to understand social networks, will be
bringing together what is known about random network formation with analyses that bring
economic behavior to the forefront. For example, van der Leij and Kovarik (2012) show how
the “friends of friends” meeting process can originate from optimizing behavior of the agents
under particular constraints.
More generally, it is important to have a more complete understanding of the decisions
that go into meeting and linking with other agents. Some aspects of these events are ran-
dom even from the perspective of the agents themselves. Other events may be dictated
by particular circumstances that are essentially deterministic to the agents, but are based
on variables that are not observed by the analysts, and so appear to be random. Thus,
a complete picture must be informed by (i) an understanding of the properties of random
formation processes, (ii) a set of theoretical frameworks with which to model the incentives
of agents and understand their optimal behavior, and (iii) empirical work that identifies the
relevant characteristics of agents and their environments, to bet understand their decisions,
and (iv) finally structural work to estimate the resulting models.
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